1. As the pivot of global economy continues to move east it is highly likely that 21st century geopolitics will continue to revolve around Asia and the SCS. Importantly, the countries of maritime Southeast Asia are not aligning only with the United States, but with a grouping of external states concerned with the nature of Chinas rise. Less sexy but no less important is a forthcoming arrangement by which Vietnam will allow the United States military to preposition supplies and equipment in Da Nang on the central coast. by M A Hossain 3 March 2023 The geostrategic significance of Bangladesh derives from its strategic location at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, endowing it with a pivotal role in the re China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and. Washington, DC 20036. The message will be clear; the era of American international leadership and predominance is over and a new preeminent power has taken its place. That grouping came under Chinese control an event that went almost entirely unnoticed in the wider world as the drama marking the end of the Vietnam War played out. For example, the Spratly Islands are claimed in entirety by China, Taiwan and Vietnam and in part by Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia; each except Brunei occupies some of the islands. The strategic landscape of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia in the early 1990s was remarkably benign with optimism in full flower. The lifting of the arms embargo also opens the door to other forms of U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation. It is the geostrategic importance that is usually the main reason for the parties to strengthen their claim over the Spratlys and the Paracels. With a new Southeast Asian strategic alignment taking shape as described, geography makes Indonesia and Malaysiaespecially due to its Sabah and Sarawak states on Borneothe regions key swing states. Recent satellite analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that Chinese fishing fleets are engaged in paramilitary work on behalf of the state rather than the commercial enterprise of fishing, the organization reported. In addition to conventional concerns about territorial defense, the South China Sea is also important for China because of its nationalist claims to all of the tiny land . In the past two weeks, Filipino . To facilitate capacity building, Washington should preserve regional defense relationships while recognizing that the ability of the United States to partner with frontline states depends on their cooperation and adherence to good governance and human rights. In 1974, Chinese gunboats attacked and defeated a small South Vietnamese military outpost in the Paracels an archipelago of reefs, atolls, and islets in the South China Sea. Rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but tension has steadily increased in recent years. More importantly, it also covers the most crucial energy routes for East Asian countries to transport oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf. The strategic importance of the SCS is mainly due to its geographical location, as the area is one of the world's busiest and most strategic shipping lanes. 2023 Center for Strategic & International Studies. The three core areas that must be defended and secured are the Malay Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak. The refusal, likely prompted by Beijing, might seem to be just another way for China to put pressure on Taiwan, which it has long regarded as a renegade province. If Chinese coercion goes unchallenged by the United States, it will send a dangerous signal about the strength of the U.S. alliance system and lessen the appeal of the United States as a security partner. Accordingly, Malaysia's note verbale serves as the strongest stance of Malaysia on the SCS in recent times and aligns itself with the top priority of its DWP. Hence, the importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. India is training crews for Vietnams new Kilo-class submarines and will sell Vietnam BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. That redundancy will grant the United States flexibility in a couple of ways. Unfortunately, the allies now lack a shared strategic outlook, thus reducing the impetus to overcome recent bilateral political hurdles. Post-Mao China, with the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader, became a major constructive presence dedicated to economic development fueled by opening the Middle Kingdom to the region and the world. In October 2020, Hong Kong's air traffic control denied a Taiwanese flight access to Pratas Island, a Taiwan-occupied feature in the South China Sea. Most of China's contested land borders were remote areas with few people, natural resources or clear military utility. With the National League for Democracy now in power in Naypyidaw, China cannot rely on Burma as an automatic ally. Beijing has also been careful to avoid estranging Aung San Suu Kyi and adopted a largely pragmatic approach to the countrys transition away from authoritarian rule. Beyond that, there are a variety of formal security cooperation agreements with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 1989 troops from the Peoples Liberation Army entered Tiananmen Square and terminated the student-led democracy demonstrations and hundreds died. There were, however, cautionary signs for those prepared to see them. Importantly, the Air Forces presence on Luzon, perhaps to be followed by regular naval rotations in Subic Bay, will put the United States in a better position to quickly seal up the Luzon Strait, which links the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea and the wider Pacific Ocean. Whomever is elected to be the next American president, that person would be wise to have in place a Plan B should the TPP fail to pass the Senate this year (such a Plan B is admittedly unlikely, given that both major candidates would bear responsibility for its failure in the first place). Any such assertion must rest on an understanding that critical U.S. national interests, including both economic and security interests, are at stake and at risk. More than 50% of world trade passes. Second, the United States should feel comfortable adopting a patient approach in pushing a return to full democracy in Thailand. It is little surprise, then, that Southeast Asian states are drawing closer to the United Statesboth seeking aid in developing their own defense capabilities and hoping that stronger ties act as a deterrent to Chinese assertiveness. Australia, for its part, has vocally supported U.S. freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea and may have quietly conducted its own in recent months. Moving forward, freedom of navigation and routine presence operations should be executed on a regular basis to demonstrate U.S. resolve to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. China's strategic reach into the South China Sea has obvious and profound implications for three sets of international actors: (1) the littoral Southeast Asian states (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines); (2) major maritime countries heavily dependent on the sea lanes through the South China Sea (including Japan, Korea, and The South China Sea contains some of the world's most important shipping lanes. Historically, Taiwan's pivotal location off the China coast and between Northeast and Southeast Asia has served a variety of strategic purposes for regional powers, both offensive and defensive. As the new administration sets out to revamp U.S. strategy in the South China Sea, it should keep the following guidelines in mind: Although Chinese cooperation is necessary to address some regional and global issuessuch as North Koreas belligerent behavior and climate changethe United States should not be held hostage by concerns that a more robust deterrence strategy will thwart bilateral cooperation. If full democratization is her goal, there is no foreign partner more important than Washington for achieving it. Importantly, American access to four airbases (with potentially more to be made available at a later date)especially those on Luzon and Palawanwill make U.S. air power resident in Southeast Asia. Many of these countries suffer from corruption and lack for effective rule of law. Chinas significant increase in spending and capability of its maritime forces is of note. This is the first of three short essays examining the South China Sea as a first order strategic problem for the United States. The result has been to heighten tensions and allow Chinese forces to more easily project military power across the region. From the report. Select Accept to consent or Reject to decline non-essential cookies for this use. It is growing more difficult to discuss Southeast Asia without discussing Japan, India and Australia, whose ties to the region and to each other are maturing and whose militarieswhether represented by personnel, aircraft, or warshipsare increasingly present in the region. 2016 The Arbitration Tribunal rules in favor of the Philippines. The United States can do more to leverage its alliances in Asia to raise the costs of Chinese efforts to undermine the regional order. In particular, shifting explanations for how the United States will manage Chinas rising power and influencealong with the military-heavy implementation of the rebalancehave exacerbated suspicions that Washington seeks to contain Beijings rise. Inconsistent messaging and policiesincluding on freedom of navigation and routine presence operationshave also led to confusion in the region. Other claimant states welcome U.S. involvement precisely because Washington does not favor one claimants territorial ambitions over those of the others. Three years ago an arbitration tribunal issued a decision finding that Chinas maritime claims in the South China Sea are inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention. The South China Sea is a core interest of both Vietnam and China. The South China Sea is one such essential waterway, made more important by the value of the sea's fisheries and subsea resources such as natural gas. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it carries one-third of global shipping, carrying trillions of dollars in trade, making it a significant geopolitical water body. The two major power of the world i.e. U.S. responses to Chinas South China Sea activities have been insufficient to alter Chinas behavior and have fed the narrative that China is pushing the United States out of the region. China remains uncompromising on sovereignty, has increased its capability to enforce its de facto control in disputed areas, and has sought to advance its claims while staying below the threshold for direct military conflict with the United States. President Musharraf requested China to invest in this important strategic chokepoint in the Indian Ocean., to which China agreed. Conservation values protection of marine habitat against wanton, unnecessary despoliation are also essential. Tokyo and Manila agreed to a strategic partnership in 2011. Thus, it is said that the South China Sea could be the battleground of World War III. In recent years, U.S. military planners have shifted their focus from counterterrorism, low intensity conflict to great power, high intensity threats. More than 50% of world trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait over the islands and waters of the SCS amounting to around $5 trillion. Allied efforts to support U.S. force posture in the region will remain vital, but the United States should also expect allies to make greater contributions in responding to Chinese coercion. 5 min. Ironically, the United States is drawing closer to communist Vietnam, in which human rights are serially abused, while growing apart from a major Vietnam War ally, largely due to concerns over democratic backsliding. It would also open the option of persistently jamming Chinese radar installations in the Spratlys. The same cannot be said for China and a maritime Southeast Asia that aligns with the United States. Those bases may be vulnerable, but before and at the outbreak of hostilities, they will allow China to project power deep into maritime Southeast Asia, to threaten commercial and military passage through the sea, and to impose and enforce an air defense identification zone. The United States needs to maintain a difficult balancing act, supporting the democratic aspirations of the Thai people while remaining a security and economic partner of choice for the elites and armed forces. That included nearly 40 percent of Chinas total trade and 90 percent of petroleum imports by China, Japan, and South Korea and nearly 6 percent of total U.S. trade.